Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 73 Issue 8 
1975 
Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1491 (1975). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol73/iss8/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
August 1975] Notes 1491 
Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power 
The Constitution forbids the enactment of ex post facto laws by 
either Congress1 or the various state legislatures.2 Although there 
is some historical support for construing the ex post facto clauses 
as prohibiting the passage of all retroactive laws, both civil and 
I. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
2. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § IO, cl. I. 
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criminal,3 courts have eschewed such an interpretation and have ap• 
plied the clauses to criminal laws only.4 
Courts have failed to define "ex post facto law" with any precision, 
often stating only that it is a law that "renders an act punishable 
in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed."G 
Employing such vague definitions, they have held that the clauses 
prohibit legislatures6 from retroactively redefining statutory crimes 
3. See Crosskey, The Ex-Post-Facto and the Contracts Clauses in the Federal Con• 
vention: A Note on the Editorial Ingenuity of James Madison, 35 U. Cm. L. REv, 248 
(1968); Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto 
Laws, 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 539 (1947); Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 M1cu. 
L. REv. 315 (1922). 
4. The doctrine was first limited to changes in criminal laws in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 386 (1798), and this limitation has not been seriously reconsidered since. See 
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 n.4 (1954). But see Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. 
(2 Pet.) 380, 415 (1829) (appendix by Johnson, J.); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580, 594 (1952). 
In Calder the Connecticut legislature, apparently sitting as a court of last resort, 
was allowed to grant a new hearing to a petitioner from a probate proceeding despite 
the fact that the time for appeal to ordinary courts had lapsed. The decision's limita-
tion of the ex post facto clauses to criminal laws has been criticized since, on the 
facts of Calder, the legislature was sitting in a judicial capacity, as allowed by the 
state constitution, rather than in its legislative capacity. See Crosskey, 14 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 539, supra note 3, at 559. This Note argues that any law that, if applied prospec-
tively, would be viewed as attempting to influence behavior through the threat of 
punishment should be subject to ex post facto challenge. See te.xt at notes 44-53 infra, 
5. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810). See also Garner v. Board of 
Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716,735 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. 
(8 Pet.) 88, ll0 (1834). 
6. Courts have been reluctant to conclude that an express ex post facto prohibition 
applies to judicial decisions. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Ross v. 
Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913); McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court 
of the United States, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 269, 272 (1927). The common-law doctrine that 
requires the strict construction of penal statutes, however, ordinarily provides sufficient 
protection for the individual, compare United States v. Kehoe, 365 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. 
Tex. 1973) (refusing to extend embezzlement to include the misappropriation of land), 
with People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 (1954) (extending theft by false 
pretenses to include false promises), and People v. Sobiek, 30 Cal. App. 3d 458, 106 
Cal. Rptr. 519, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973) (extending embezzlement to partner-
ship funds), and courts have often acknowledged that ex post facto problems would 
arise if penal statutes were not strictly construed. See United States v. Irick, 369 F. Supp. 
594, 597 n.l (S.D. Tex. 1974); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 634, 470 P.2d 
617, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 490 (1970). The strict application of this doctrine, which 
results as much from deference to the legislature as from consideration of the affected 
individual's position, has at times led to results counter to the expectations of both 
the legislature and the criminal defendant. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 
306 (1941) (officer of government corporation not within the definition of government 
officer for purposes of fraudulent impersonation statute); McBoyle v. United States, 283 
U.S. 25 (1931) (airplane not within the definition of motor vehicle for purposes of 
theft statute); United States v. Irick, 369 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (statute pro-
hibiting obstruction of an officer of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
does not protect officers of its admitted successor, the Drug Enforcement Agency). 
The reluctance of the courts to apply a strict ex post facto limitation to their deci-
sions results from an awareness of their necessary role. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 
213,247 n.3 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). Legislatures rarely arc willing 
or able to formulate statutes that clearly anticipate every situation to which they might 
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to include acts not previously included7 and from increasing the 
punishment for past acts already considered criminal.8 Because of 
be applied, and therefore courts are properly expected to interpret and apply such 
statutes. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401, 415 
(1958). But it is often difficult to distinguish between the interpretation of statutes 
and the extension of statutes. The courts are currently struggling with just such a 
problem in determining whether the obscenity standard articulated in Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), can properly be applied in prosecutions for activities 
occurring before that decision. See United States v. Jacobs, 513 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hill, 500 
F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1974); United 
"States v. Thevis, 454 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. B & H Dist. Corp., 
375 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Wis. 1974); United States v. Marks, 364 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. 
Ky. 1973); United States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp. 380 (C.D. Cal. 1973); McKinney v. 
State, 292 Ala. 484, 296 S.2d 228 (1974), cert. granted sub nom. McKinney v. Alabama, 
43 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. June 23, 1975) (No. 74-532); Herman v. State, - Ark. -, 512 
S.W.2d 923 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 953 (1975). Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15, 41-42 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the strict application of an 
ex post facto limitation would in many instances preclude a court from reconciling 
conflicting interpretations of a penal statute without resort to a prospective opinion. 
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.3 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). See State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 630, 107 P.2d 324 (1940). 
When a decision clearly extends a penal statute of settled or obvious meaning, 
however, an ex post facto limitation may be invoked. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347 (1964) (prohibition invoked when state supreme court, overruling its 
prior decisions, extended criminal trespass statute to include persons remaining on 
public property after requested to leave). Cf. Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972) 
(per curiam). But, in general, federal courts have been reluctant to determine whether 
a state court has expanded the reach of a state penal statute. See United States ex rel. 
Waters v. Bensinger, 507 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Hardeman v. 
Wells, 379 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Mass. 1974); Almeida v. Rundle, 255 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. 
Pa. 1966), afjd., 383 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 863 (1968). But see 
United States ex rel, Horelick v. Criminal Court, 366 F. Supp. 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
7. Statutes that lmpose a penalty for a continuing situation resulting from prior 
unpenalized acts should not be considered ex post facto, however. Thus a law making 
unlawful the possession of certain goods lawfully acquired should not be considered 
ex post facto. Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tran-
burger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915). But not all statutes the violation of which conceivably can 
be avoided by some prospective action should be considered permissible. For example, 
a statute imposing a penalty on all those who have done a particular act unless they 
register within a week should be recognized as an ex post facto law. But cf. CoNG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 642-43, 1155-56 (1865) (discussing a Civil War statute that 
essentially required deserters to tum themselves in or lose their citizenship). 
8. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937). 
Laws expanding the definitions of crimes or imposing additional penalties for acts 
already proscribed by criminal statutes are invalid as applied to acts committed before 
their passage, but will remain valid as applied prospectively. When the application of 
a statute is found violative of the ex post facto prohibition, the law as it existed at 
the time of the crime may be applied in the case (assuming no bar to retrial exists) 
unless it has been expressly or impliedly repealed without a saving clause. Jaehne v. 
New York, 128 U.S. 189 (1888). If no saving clause exists, prosecution may be barred 
completely, see, e.g., Hartung v. People, 22 N.Y. 95 (1860), because of the common-law 
doctrine of abrogation, which prohibits the prosecution from proceeding under a 
repealed statute. See generally United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214 (1939); Comment, 
Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal 
Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 120 (1972); 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1157 (1972), Because of 
this, courts have at times hesitated to find statutes invalid on ex post facto grounds. 
See, e.g., Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483 (1890). 
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the absence of a clear definition of the ex post facto prohibition and 
the inadequacy of the judicial inquiry into its rationale and scope, 
uncertainty remains concerning its application to legislative acts 
that do not clearly fit within either of these two categories. 
This Note explores the rationale underlying the prohibition of 
ex post facto laws and formulates an analytic framework for a more 
principled application .of the prohibition. This analytic framework 
is then used, first, to critique the present strict application of the 
prohibition to changes in criminal "punishments" and determine 
whether the prohibition should be applied to sanctions imposed out-
side the criminal context, and, second, to determine the degree to 
which the prohibition should be applied to procedural changes. 
Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull9 was the first Supreme 
Nevertheless, the prohibition has stood as a considerable obstacle to prosecution 
under statutes enacted or amended after the occurrence of an alleged wrongful act, 
Most legislatures are aware of this limitation on their power and thus refrain from 
wholly redefining crimes with the intent to have these new definitions applied retro-
actively. It has been held, however, that an enactment clarifying the language of a 
statute or making other minor changes may amount to an ex post facto law if it 
results in the statute being susceptible to a different interpretation, This is true even 
when the change merely corrects an error in wording or encompasses more expressly 
activity that clearly was intended to be proscribed by the statute being amended, See, 
e.g., State v. Bell, 8 Wash. App. 670, 508 P.2d 1398 (1973) (statute that allowed sales of 
narcotics "for therapeutic purposes only" could not be applied when the law at the 
time of the act allowed such sales for only "legitimate medical purposes'?, But cf, 
People v. Rozell, 212 Cal. App. 2d 875, 28 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1963) (incorporation of valid 
administrative regulation into statutory scheme defining theft by welfare fraud found 
valid as a "clarification" rather than a change in the law). 
Changes in language unsusceptible to expansive interpretations probably do not 
invalidate the retroactive application of a statute. See Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 
358 Mass. 672, 266 N.E.2d 662 (1971) (statute changing language regarding denomina, 
tion as accessory or principal not ex post facto). But it is unclear whether a defendant 
protesting a retroactive change susceptible to expansive interpretation must show that 
the change in fact affects the characterization and consequences of his act. See State v. 
Bunn, 50 Hawaii 351, 440 P.2d 528 (1968) (answering no). Cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (no discussion of particular effect on the defendant was 
found necessary). This issue rarely arises, however, for when jury instructions arc 
phrased according to the new, broad definition of the crime, the reviewing court, absent 
a special verdict, can tell only that the defendant's act was within this new broad 
definition. A new trial will always be necessary to determine if the defendant's act was 
within the old definition. But cf. Wainwright v. Stone, 441 U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam) 
(rejecting defendants' claim that their convictions should be reversed because of a later 
state ruling that the statute was impermissibly vague, since the statute was not vague as 
to those actions for which defendants were convicted). 
The prohibition also precludes an overzealous prosecutor from applying retroactively 
a statute designed for prospective application only when the alleged act was also 
proscribed by an existing statute. For instance, the court in United States v, BclI, 371 
F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Tex. 1973), held that the false declarations statute, which made 
criminal the making of "irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point 
in question," could not be applied without ex post facto results in instances where the 
first declaration was made before the passage of the statute, even though the second 
declaration doubtless constituted perjury and even though the new crime could have 
been construed to consist solely of the second declaration, 
9. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Justice Chase's opinion is the most often quoted, but 
should probably not be treated as the opinion of the Court. 
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Court discussion of the ex post facto prohibition. Since no people 
would with "reason and justice" entrust their government with the 
power to pass ex post facto laws, he reasoned, courts should assume 
that all legislatures lacked this power. Congress and the state legis-
latures were thus powerless to enact such laws, even without express 
constitutional prohibitions:10 Recalling the past excesses of Parlia-
ment, the framers had included the ex post facto clauses simply "for 
greater caution."11 Justice Chase concluded that the clauses proscribe 
the following laws: 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the 
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes 
such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it 
greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law an-
nexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the 
legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than 
the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in 
order to convict the offender.12 
He failed to identify the evil underlying these laws, however, except 
to say that "no man should be compelled to do what the laws do 
not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws pennit."18 
Unfortunately, courts enforcing the Calder list of prohibited laws 
have been equally vague and have invalidated on ex post facto 
grounds statutes that made only trivial changes in crimes and their 
10. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388-89. See also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 
266 (1927) (Washington, J., dissenting). Many later writers have found ex post facto 
criminal statutes inherently invalid: "Laws of this kind are so at variance with the 
general idea of legislative power, that, even in the absence of a constitutional prohibi-
tion, it may be fairly doubted whether they would be tolerated by the courts in this 
country." w. WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION AND CoNSI"RUcrION OF RETROACTIVE 
LAws § 270, at 315 (1880). See also Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: 
A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 :MINN. L. R.Ev. 775, 791 (1936). Article 11 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflects this viewpoint: "No one shall be held 
guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute 
a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the 
penal offence was committed." G.A. Res. 217 (III), art. 11, § 2, 3 U.N. GAOR, pt. I, at 
73, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), Others have disagreed as to the universal nature of the 
prohibition. See Green, The Maxim Nullen Crimen Sine Lege and the Eichmann 
Trial, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 457, 471 (1962); In re Rauter, [1949] Ann. Dig. 526, 543 
(No. 193) (Special Court of Cassation, Neth.). 
11. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390. Justice Chase went on to give several examples of acts 
of Parliament that he viewed as particularly notorious, including the incidents in-
volving the Earl of Strafford (1961), Sir John Fenwick (1696), Lord Clarendon (1669), and 
the Bishop of Atterbury (1723). Significantly, this list included not only cases involving 
punishments for acts that had not been criminal, but also acts increasing punishments 
(the Coventry Act, 22 &: 23 Car. 2, c. 1 (1670)), and changing rules regarding the ad-
missibility of evidence. See text at notes 37-43 infra. 
12. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 (emphasis deleted). 
13. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388. 
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punishments14 without discussing the theoretical justifications for 
the prohibition. More importantly, because the prohibition has 
lacked a principled content, courts have been unduly reluctant to 
go beyond the Calder list and examine the application of the prohi-
bition to punitive sanctions imposed retroactively in noncriminal 
contexts and to criminal procedural changes that, in a manner simi-
lar to substantive law changes, increase the government's ability to 
punish individuals for past acts.15 
A more principled and consistent application of the ex post facto 
clause must begin with an inquiry into the undesirable characteristics 
of retroactive laws, in particular those that affect adversely individ-
uals who have committed particular past acts. One objection to such 
laws is that they fail to provide fair warning. An individual should 
be warned that his contemplated acts are punishable and of the extent 
to which they can be punished,16 since only if he is warned of these 
consequences can society expect him to refrain from acting. A related 
objection to retroactive legislation is that it frustrates reliance upon 
existing laws. An individual who acted in reliance upon existing 
definitions of crimes cannot fairly be punished and cannot be pun-
ished without detracting from the ability of the criminal law to 
provide guidance for conduct. 
These interrelated objections do not, however, as some decisions 
suggest,17 justify the proscription of all retroactive punishment. For 
14. See text at notes 37-43 infra. 
15. See text at notes 45-53 infra. 
16. This idea of fair warning has been most clearly articulated in discussions ot 
vagueness challenges outside the context of first amendment rights: "That the terms 
of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those 
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, 
is a well-recognized requirement consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and 
the settled rules of law," Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 
(1938). But the warning necessary to withstand a vagueness challenge need not be 
found in the language of the statute itself. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23 (1973) 
(per curiam); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 273 (1940). See 
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 
73-74 (1960). Indeed, it has been suggested that "'[t]he criterion in such cases is to 
examine whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested 
a more circumspect conduct.'" Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), quoting 
1 E. EAsr, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 262 (1806). 
17. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 
342 U.S. 580, 593 (1952) (dictum). See also McAllister, supra note 6, at 287. Although 
his discussion of ex post facto laws was far from comprehensive, Blackstone mentioned 
the lack of warning and frustration of reliance as being among their objectionable 
features: 
[Legislatures should let their laws be known, not like Caligula.) There is still a 
more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws ex post facto 
(after the fact); when after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the 
legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a 
punishment upon the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible that the 
party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be after-
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example, the fair warning rationale seems inapplicable to situations 
in which an individual commits an act in the mistaken belief that it 
is criminal only to find that, perhaps because of a legislative over-
sight, it was not criminal. The rationale is equally inapplicable when 
an individual commits an act that is criminal when committed, but 
is mistakenly prosecuted under a subsequently enacted statute.18 
Moreover, the rationale is at best marginally applicable in situations 
where society, through its legislative body, determines that an indi-
vidual should have knmm at the time he acted that his clearly 
immoral act deserved punishment. In short, while ex post facto laws 
are undesirable, society may at times determine that they are less 
undesirable than leaving reprehensible acts unpunished.19 
The reliance rationale, while significant, also fails to support a 
blanket prohibition of retroactive punishments.2° First, few alleged 
criminals know the law, much less rely on it. Second, it would seem 
that reliance should be honored only if it is reasonable. In many 
instances, however, reliance on existing criminal laws is reasonable 
only because changes are proscribed by the ex post facto prohibition. 
For example, the reliance rationale would not seem to mandate a 
refusal to allow conviction under a statute newly amended to clarify 
its application in view of technological progress, such as a statute 
prohibiting theft of a motor vehicle that is amended to include theft 
of an aircraft.21 Third, emphasis on reliance alone does not explain 
wards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain 
from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and 
unjust. 
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •46. 
18. Cf. United States v. Bell, 371 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Tex. 1973). Even if the statute 
existing at the time the act was committed has not been repealed, the double jeopardy 
clause may prohibit reprosecution. 
19. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L, REv. 
593, 619 (1958). Cf. In re Goering [1946] Ann. Dig. 203, 208 (No. 92) (International Mili-
tary Tribunal, Nuremberg) ("To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance 
of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is obvi-
ously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, 
and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were 
allowed to go unpunished"). 
20. The ability of society as a whole to rely on existing laws has been offered as a 
basis for the ex post facto prohibition since without such a limitation no legal 
system is possible: 
[P]enal laws should not be retroactive to the disadvantage of those to whom they 
apply. [This is] implicit in the notion of regulating behavior by public rules •••• 
A tyrant might change laws without notice, and punish (if that is the right word) 
his subjects accordingly, because he takes pleasure in seeing how long it takes them 
to figure out what the new rules are from observing the penalties he inflicts. But 
these rules would not be a legal system, since they would not serve to organize 
social behavior by providing a basis for legitimate expectations. 
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE 238 (1971). Such a statement does not explain, however, 
why the prohibition must be absolute. 
21. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931); note 6 supra. 
1498 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 73:1465 
why reliance on criminal laws should be absolutely protected while 
reliance on laws in other areas is only one factor used in considering 
whether an amended law can be applied retroactively.22 Finally, it 
is an established principle of criminal law that a defendant cannot 
escape punishment by pleading that he was unaware of existing law. 
Since punishment is not conditioned upon actual knowledge of the 
law, distinctions based on whether the law was actually in existence 
at the time the act was committed seem arbitrary.23 
A second undesirable characteristic of retroactively applied laws 
is implicit in the Calder decision-that they fail to serve their pri-
mary, if not sole, function. By proscribing all retroactive criminal 
legislation, Calder limits the ends for which the legislature may use 
the criminal law. The legislature may not punish when no law has 
been violated, despite the moral indignation an act may have created. 
Although the legislature may take into account the need for retri-
bution and rehabilitation when prescribing prospective punishments, 
it cannot reassess the sufficiency of the punishment after an act is 
committed, even if it determines that the punishment does not 
correspond with the harm that resulted from the act, with the out-
rage provoked by the individual's behavior, or with the incorri-
gibility of the actor. Thus, the ex post facto clause as interpreted in 
Calder severely limits the legislature's ability to use the criminal 
laws solely in a retributive or rehabilitive manner. 
To the extent that the decision in Calder reflects the intent of 
the framers of the Constitution it suggests that they had in mind 
a particular model for the legitimate operation of the criminal law: 
Criminal laws should primarily influence behavior through the threat 
22. See generally Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of 
Retroactive Legislation, 73 HAR.v. L. REv. 692 (1962). Several explanations in terms of 
reliance have been offered for this distinction. First, the consequences of penal statutes, 
especially the deprivation of liberty, are far more severe. Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 
43 U.S.L.W. 4929, 4937 (U.S. June 26, 1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). But the doctrine 
is applied as vigorously in cases involving only monetary fines. Second, the moral con-
demnation of the community usually accompanies the invocation of the criminal law, 
Hart, supra note 6, at 404. But see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) 
(assuming the existence of crimes the conviction for which has no moral content in 
suggesting that such crimes need have no mens rea). Third, historically the power of 
the state over individuals has been most dramatically displayed in the exercise of the 
criminal law. This factor is at least as important as the others. Cf. F. ALLEN, THE 
CRillIBS OF PoLmcs 4 (1974). 
23. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 63 (1960): w. LAFAVE &: 
A. ScoIT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 90 (1972), Cf. United States v. Casson, 434 F,2d 
415 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court in Casson, applying a statute increasing the punishment 
for burglary that was signed eight hours before, but only announced simultaneously 
with, the commission of a burglary, said: "Assuming arguendo that legislation must 
pass a notice test to escape an ex post facto condemnation, we decide that the public 
are charged with knowledge of all the published information concerning a congressional 
bill that is available during the entire legislative process • • , • Actual notice to a 
particular individual is not a prerequisite." 434 F.2d at 422. 
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of punishment.24 Under this model, an individual presumably will 
refrain from acting when the punitive consequences of his contem-
plated act outweigh any personal interests served by that act. The 
severity of the punishment for an act should therefore reflect the 
degree to which the legislature desires to deter individuals from 
committing that act and should establish the "price" the individual 
must "pay" to commit the act.25 Only when an individual chooses 
to act in violation of the law should he be subjected to punishment 
and then only to the punishment set forth in the law at the time 
of his choice.26 Thus the framers found retroactively applied punish-
ments objectionable because they could not serve the recognized 
purposes of punishment. 
The reach of this objection to retroactive legislation is clearly 
limited. Laws that have regulation, retribution, and rehabilitation 
as significant goals can satisfy these goals when applied to acts occur-
ring before their enactment. Deterrence, however, is still central to 
the operation of the criminal law,27 notwithstanding that theories 
of human action have become more complicated since the Consti-
tution was written and the formulas used to calculate punishment 
24. Perhaps the best statement of this approach can be found in an early Massa-
chusetts case: 
The reason why these laws are so universally condemned is, that they overlook 
the great object of all criminal law, which is, to hold up the fear and certainty of 
punishment as a counteracting motive, to the minds of persons tempted to crime, 
to prevent them from committing it. But a punishment prescribed after an act 
is done, cannot, of course, present any such motive. It is contrary to the funda-
mental principle of criminal justice, which is, that the person who violates a law 
deserves punishment, because he wilfully breaks a law, which, in theory, he knows 
or may know to exist. 
Jacquins v. Commonwealth, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 279,281 (1852). 
25. See J. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORAIS AND LEGISLATION (1780), Teprinted' in I 
WoRKS 86-90 (1843). 
26. Thus, Slawson has stated: 
[O]ur legal system condemns a man only because he has acted in a certain manner. 
This limitation of the criminal sanction seems to rest, ultimately, on a belief in 
free will. A man is criminal only if he chooses to do that which society calls 
criminal •••• [!]he absolute ban on ex-post-facto criminal laws is explicable as a 
ban on condemning a man when the element of choice which society has chosen 
as its basis of condemnation, i.e., knowledge that an act is criminally wrong, could 
not have been present. 
Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 
CALIF. L. R.Ev. 216, 222 (1960). 
27. See J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 115 (11th ed. G. Williams 1957). This same 
deterrence principle would also invalidate any criminal laws with which it is impossible 
to comply. Perhaps such laws, even more clearly than ex post facto laws, should be 
invalid because of the extraordinary power and potential for abuse given to enforce-
ment officials. The Supreme Court has not found it necessary to articulate such a 
doctrine. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (relying on due process gen-
erally to find unconstitutional a local ordinance requiring registration of felons); 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (relying on cruel and unusual punishment 
to find unconstitutional the "crime" of drug addiction). 
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levels have become more sophisticated.28 Thus, most criminal laws 
today would fail to serve their principal purpose when applied retro• 
actively. Outside the criminal context, however, laws arguably im-
posing disabilities frequently serve purposes other than deterrence. 
Such laws may well be immune from criticism based on this objection. 
The third objectionable characteristic of retroactive legislation 
is its potential for legislative abuse. The framers of the Constitution 
commonly regarded ex post facto laws and bills of attainder20 as 
weapons of tyrants and despots used to achieve politically motivated 
results. In denying legislatures the power to use these weapons the 
framers may have been less concerned with the subtleties of criminal 
law theories than with the recent abuses of governmental power 
directed at political enemies.30 While some members of the conven-
tion considered ex post facto laws so obviously unjust that a consti-
tutional provision was unnecessary, a general distrust of legislatures81 
and the grave possibility of legislative abuse82 resulted in the inclu-
sion of the prohibition.33 By disallowing retroactive retributive 
measures completely, the framers prevented legislatures from using 
them against any particular group.34 Their fears were not unfounded, 
28. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Early advocates of preventive and 
rehabilitative criminology (especially those involved with the prediction of criminal 
activity through physical and psychological characteristics) were troubled by the 
possible inconsistencies between action taken upon their findings and the traditional 
need to prove a specific previously defined criminal act before an individual's liberty 
could be imposed upon. See Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Ther-
apy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 310-12 (1974). 
29. The ex post facto prohibition, and the prohibition of bills of attainder, while 
involving different legislative devices, were aimed at preventing the same sort of im-
proper legislative motivation. While ex post facto laws changed the laws that courts 
applied, bills of attainder assessed guilt and imposed punishment without intervention 
of the judiciary. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Often bills of attainder 
were also ex post facto laws, although theoretically they could involve convictions for 
existing offenses. z. CHAFFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 
92-93 (1956); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 259-61 (1868). 
30. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.3 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
31. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 375-76 
(1937). 
32. Early interpretations of the ex post facto clause stressed this aspect of their 
use. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 387, 389 (Chase, J.), 399 (Iredall, J.). 
33. See, e.g., the remarks of Daniel Carol of Maryland at the convention, as reported 
by Madison: "[E]xperience overruled all other calculations. It had proved that in 
whatever light they might be viewed by civilians or others, the State Legislatures had 
passed them, and they had taken effect." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 31, at 376. For 
evidence of the use of ex post facto punishments in the newly independent states, see 
Thompson, Anti-loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution, 3 ILL. L. REV, 
81 (1908); Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New York, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1948); 
Respublica v. Gordon, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 
14 (1800); Thompson v. Carr, 5 N.H. 510 (1831); Jackson v. Gratz, 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 
248 (1806). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 351 a. Hamilton ed. 1868) a. Madison). 
34. It is in fact possible that the reason why legislatures may not retroactively im-
pose punishment for recognized immoral acts lies not in the potential for legislative 
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for ex post facto laws and bills of attainder have most often been the 
product of times of great political turmoil like the post-Civil War35 
and post-World War II36 periods. Whether the ex post facto clauses 
were included in the Constitution because all such laws were con-
sidered inherently unjust, or because an absolute prohibition was 
considered necessary to exclude the possibility of vindictive legis-
lative action, is a question that is difficult to answer authoritatively. 
Its resolution would require an historical exploration into whether 
the framers of the Constitution accepted the legitimacy of any of 
the purposes for retroactively imposed sanctions. By including an 
apparently absolute prohibition in the Constitution, the framers did 
not end the debate, however, since they failed to define the term 
"ex post facto law" with any degree of certainty. 
These objectionable characteristics of retroactive laws are in-
structive in applying the ex post facto clauses in a more principled 
manner. Thus, in deciding whether a law is proscribed by the ex 
post facto prohibition, a court should consider three factors: first, 
does the law penalize activities in the absence of fair warning and 
frustrate reasonable reliance on existing laws; second, can the law 
serve its ostensible purpose-for instance, does the law attempt to 
regulate behavior through threats of unpleasant consequences where 
deterrence is no longer possible; and, finally, could the law have been 
a consequence of legislative vindictiveness. Clearly, no precise test 
can be formulated from these factors, but courts examining laws for 
possible ex post facto violations should be alert for the presence of 
any of the three. In rare instances, the clear presence of one of these 
abuse, but rather in the impossibility of consensus in a pluralistic society as to whether 
an individual should have known his act was immoral. There are, however, legal systems 
that continue to allow such determinations to be made by courts, if not by legis• 
latures. See Shaw v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220, noted in 75 HARv. L. 
REv. 1652 (1962); Gordon, Crimes Without lAws?, 11 JURID. REv. (n.s.) 214 (1966). 
Similarly, many discussions of crimes against humanity have justified the punishment 
of war crimes by assuming that certain behavior would be universally condemned. See 
Green, supra note 10, at 459. Yet such a truly universal moral standard may not be 
possible, even as to homicide. Compare In re Ohlendorf, [1948] Ann. Dig. 656 (No. 217) 
(United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg) ("Certainly no one can claim with the 
slightest pretense at reasoning that there is any taint of ex post factoism in the law of 
murder"), with Shepherd v. People, 25 N.Y. 406 (1862) (finding the change from life 
imprisonment to the death penalty significant enough to preclude punishment for 
murder entirely). Perhaps the strictness with which an ex post facto limitation should 
be applied in a society should vary inversely with the extent to which that society's 
needs arc recognized and goals are shared by its members. Thus, disciplinary systems 
within such institutions as military organizations, schools, and professional associations 
need not describe conduct for which sanctions will be imposed with the same precision 
as those peopled by more diffuse groups. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) 
(schools); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (military). 
35. See Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872); Ex parte Garland, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). 
36. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580 (1952); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
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objectionable factors may warrant invalidation of a statute. More 
often, a court must engage in a delicate balancing of governmental 
interests in legislative and administrative flexibility against societal 
interests in having laws that can be relied on and laws that do not 
stem from improperly motivated legislative acts. 
Traditionally, however, courts have not balanced these interests 
and consequently have rigidly interpreted the prohibition.87 In 
the criminal context courts without much apparent thought have 
uniformly invalidated any retroactively applied increases in the pun-
ishment that a trial court can impose for an offense.88 Because of 
the uniform precedent for applying the prohibition to punishment 
increases since Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull, it is difficult 
to contest such decisions.89 Arguably, changes in punishment level 
made for the purpose of rehabilitation should not be proscribed as 
ex post facto since rehabilitation is an important function of criminal 
law that can be served by retroactive punishment increases. The 
rationales of the prohibition, however, detract from this contention. 
First, the ability to impose punishment increases is a power that can 
easily be abused. Second, significant punishment increases may upset 
the calculations of an individual who violated a law when the 
punishment was at a certain level and who perhaps would have re-
frained from acting had the punishment been higher.4° Finally, 
setting punishment levels with individualized rehabilitation as a 
goal can be accomplished without violating the prohibition by grant-
ing courts broad discretion in sentencing. 
In applying the ex post facto prohibition, courts have struck down 
37. See notes 4-8 supra and accompanying text, 
38. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937) (statute making maximum 
sentences mandatory, while also making parole available, found to be an increase in 
punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause), 
Changes that lessen the punishment for crimes will not violate the clause. Calder 
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (Chase, J.) (dictum). In applying the prohibition, 
courts have thus been forced to decide whether hanging is less humane than electrocu-
tion, Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915) (answering yes), and whether 
extending the time before a death sentence can be executed is a mitigation in punish• 
ment, Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905)-not easy determinations, Shepherd 
v. People, 25 N.Y. 406 (1862). 
39. But it has been argued that imprecision in the standards for prescription of 
punishments results in either "insecurity of the general community" or "injustice 
to the morally innocent • • • deprived of knowledge of how they are to act to avoid 
the threatened sanction of the law" in a way that compels precision in standards for 
substantive crimes. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing 
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REv. 904, 923 (1962). The strictness with which the prohibition 
is applied to punishment increases does appear anomalous in view of broad judicial 
discretion in sentencing if the prohibition is aimed at honoring calculations of the 
defendant. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 3-11 (1973). 
40. The effect on an individual's calculations resulting from changes in definitions 
of crimes is obviously qualitatively different from the effect resulting from changes 
in penalties. In the former case the defendant could not have known his act was wrong; 
in the latter he simply was unaware of the severity of the punishment, If the duty to 
obey the law is absolute, its breach could serve as justification for any punishment, 
See F. ZIMRING &: G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 46 (1973). 
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as unlawful increases in punishment many retroactive changes in 
the post-conviction treatment of individuals, including such punish-
ment "increases" as providing solitary rather than ordinary confine-
ment before execution,41 changing the availability of parole and 
good-time benefits,42 and restricting the availability of bail on 
appeal.48 It is difficult to discern why, in many of these instances, 
the prohibition has been so automatically applied, for the arguments 
against granting legislatures the power to impose measurable punish-
ment increases are at most marginally applicable to minor changes 
in the handling of prisoners. Reliance on such procedures is rare. 
Moreover, most such changes are meant simply to regulate the han-
dling of imprisoned or paroled convicts-a purpose they can fulfill 
-l"ather than to punish them further for their past acts that can no 
longer be deterred. 
The uniform invalidation of such minor changes can only be 
justified as a prophylactic rule to preclude improper legislative 
manipulation of the adjudicatory and rehabilitative processes. The 
resulting cost, however, is that the legislature's hands are tied: any 
new information that it may acquire regarding the effectiveness of 
certain rehabilitative techniques may not be applied to rectify past 
errors. For example, should it come to light that the goal of rehabili-
tation would be furthered by decreasing certain parole benefits pre-
viously granted, the legislature could not use this information to 
41. See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). But see Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 
483 (1890), in which the Supreme Court struggled to interpret a similar change as 
prospective only, thereby avoiding an ex post facto result. 
42. See In re Griffin, 63 Cal. 2d 757,408 P.2d 959,'48 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1965); State 
ex rel. Woodward v. Board of Parole, 155 La. 699, 99 s .. 534 (1924); State ex rel. Nelson 
v. Ellsworth, 142 Mont. 14, 380 P.2d 886 (1963); Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 86 Nev. 252, 
468 P.2d 350 (1970); Ex parte Alegria, 464 S.W.2d 868. (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also 
Love v. Fitzharris, 311 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Cal. 1970), afjd., 460 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1972), 
vacated as moot, 409 U.S. HOO (1973) (administrative change in the interpretation of 
the parole statute made after the petitioner had been sentenced under the old inter-
pretation found to be ex post facto). But see Singleton v. Shafer, 313 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. 
Pa. 1970); Graham v. Thompson, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957). But cf. People ex rel. 
Kleinger v. Wilson, 5 N.Y.S.2d 934, 254 App. Div. 406 (1938) (a statutory change held 
not ex post facto that made parole available earlier, but subjected the parolee to 
recommitment beyond the running of the original sentence). 
Often these cases have distinguished between those benefits that are technically 
available as a matter of grace and those that are actually incorporated into the sen-
tence. See, e.g., Love v. Fitzharris, 460 F.2d 382, 384 n.l (9th Cir. 1972). However, 
statutes enacted after the original crime that increase the punishment for additional 
crimes committed while on parole have not been held ex post facto, see, e.g., Lincoln 
v. California Adult Authority, 435 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1970), unless they affect the 
original sentence itself. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967), 
affd., 390 U.S. 713 (1968) (per curiam). Changes in the administration of parole and 
probation have been held not to be ex post facto even though subtle changes in the 
standards for revocation may be involved. See, e.g., Voorhees v. Cox, 140 F.2d 132 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. '133 (1944). These holdings seem consistent with the treat-
ment of statutes that enhance a former convict's susceptibility to punishment, see 
text at note 49 infra, and of changes in trial proceedings generally. See text at notes 
54-92 infra. 
43. See Richbexg v. State, 238 S.2d 296 (Fla. 1970). 
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rehabilitate more effectively individuals who committed their crim-
inal acts before this information became available. Moreover, the 
invalidation of all minor changes places a great burden on ju-
dicial and administrative agencies effectuating these changes by 
requiring them to apply each change only to those individuals who 
committed their criminal acts after the statute's effective date. There 
is little reason why sufficient protection cannot be provided the 
defendant by a less stringent application of the prohibition. For 
example, courts could invalidate all laws that measurably increase 
punishment or that, because of their selective application, indi-
cate possible legislative ill motive, and require, before upholding 
any other changes arguably increasing punishments, that the govern• 
ment demonstrate that legitimate regulatory interests are furthered 
by the change. 
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the ex post 
facto clause cannot be avoided by giving a civil form to an essentially 
penal statute,44 the ex post facto prohibition has been infrequently 
applied to sanctions and disabilities imposed outside the criminal 
context. Disabilities arguably of a penal nature are often imposed 
through both direct legislative enactments and noncriminal adjudi-
cations. For example, legislatures have excluded individuals from 
participating in specified present and future activities only because 
these individuals committed certain acts in the past. Statutory dis-
abilities, such as disenfranchisement,45 disqualification from certain 
offices or professions,46 the inability to own firearms47 or appear at 
44. Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878). In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 277 (1866), the Court struck down as bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws state and federal legislation requiring that attomeys, clergymen, teachers, and 
those seeking public or corporate offices take oaths denying that they had engaged in 
any act of sympathy with the Confederacy. These laws were found to be penal in 
nature, rather than regulatory, because such laws were historically regarded as penal, 
because they were aimed at past, not future, acts, and because the past acts had no 
relation to fitness for the office involved. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319-21, 327. See also Hiss v. 
Hampton, 338 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) 
(statute providing that anyone who had belonged to the Communist Party during the 
preceding five years could not serve as a labor organization official invalidated as a 
bill of attainder on the ground that it was a punishment imposed by a legislative act; 
Court concluded that no valid regulation could be based on the assumption that Com-
munists were more likely to cause political strikes). But see DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 
U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (upholding a similar disability imposed on any person convicted 
of a felony as a legitimate regulation). 
45. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884); Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112 
(1866). Cf. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 1048 (1968). 
46. See, e.g., DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Hawker v. New York, 170 
U.S. 189 (1898); Watson v. State Commr. of Banking, 223 A.2d 834 (Mc. 1966), appeal 
dismissed, 389 U.S. 9 (1967). See also United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 
1973) (dictum); Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974) (involving a disability 
imposed as a condition in pardon). But cf, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 
282 (1957). 
47. See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 819 
U.S. 770 (1943); People v. Camperlingo, 69 Cal. App. 466, 231 P. 601 (1924), 
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racetracks,48 and the susceptibility to higher punishment for future 
criminal convictions,49 are commonly imposed on those convicted of 
felonies, including those convicted prior to the statutory imposition 
of the disabilities. Adjudicatory proceedings involving, for example, 
deportation,50 disbarment and similar sanctions within other pro-
fessions,51 or the administration of economic regulations,52 also im~ 
pose severe sanctions on individuals because of specific prior acts, 
often without precise warning to the individual at the time of his 
act of the possible imposition of such sanctions. In dismissing ex 
post facto challenges to the imposition of such disabilities and sanc-
tions, courts have all too often failed to consider the possibility that 
retroactive punishments imposed outside the criminal process are 
as unjust and as potentially abusive as those imposed within the 
criminal process. 
There is no clear distinction between these noncriminal laws and 
criminal laws from the individual's point of view. Both often are 
relied on, deter the commission of proscribed actions, impose un-
desirable consequences, and result at times from legislative vindic-
tiveness. To be sure, the government's need for administrative and 
regulatory flexibility outside the criminal process is greater than its 
need for flexibility in establishing criminal sentences. But this in-
terest is insufficient to support a general conclusion that no law out-
side the criminal context is prohibited by the ex post facto clauses. 
While no exact test can be derived for identifying those laws that 
are sufficiently objectionable to warrant invalidation, there is little 
reason why courts cannot engage in a balancing of interests that is 
more sensitive to interests of the individual. In particular, courts 
should scrutinize laws that, if applied prospectively, would be viewed 
as controlling behavior or that sufficiently penalize certain acts to 
deter individuals from committing those acts. The retroactive appli-
cation of such laws should be upheld only if the laws serve significant 
regulatory interests unrelated to the deterrence of behavior.53 In 
48. See, e.g., Mones v. Austin, 318 F. Supp. 653 (S.D. Fla. 1970). 
49. See, e.g., McDonald v Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 3ll (1901); Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 
Cal. 429 (1873); Myers v. District Court, - Colo.-, 518 P.2d 836 (1974). 
50. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
51. See, e.g., In re Brown, - W. Va. -, 197 S.E.2d 814 (1973); Braverman v. Bar 
Assn. of Baltimore City, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473 (1956) (dicta); In re Sparrow, 338 
Mo. 203, 90 S.W.2d 401 (1935). But see State v. Fourchy, 106 La. 743, 31 S. 325 (1901). 
52. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, II0 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 
1953), revd. on other grounds sub nom. FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 
284 (1954). But see United States v. WHAS, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 603, 606 (W.D. Ky. 1966), 
afjd., 385 F, Supp. 784 (6th Cir. 1967). 
53. Such an examination is not entirely unfamiliar to the courts: 
The mark of an ex post facto law is the imposition of what can fairly be designated 
punishment for past acts. The question in each case where unpleasant consequences 
are brought to Eear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legisla• 
tive aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction 
of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present 
situation •••• 
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addition, courts should be sensitive to claims of reliance and should 
carefully balance the individual's reliance interest against the regu-
latory interests of the state. 
On several occasions courts have employed the ex post facto 
prohibition to invalidate changes in criminal procedure,M perhaps 
in recognition of the fact that such changes can adversely affect an 
individual as significantly as changes in substantive law. However, 
no clear test for applying the prohibition to procedural changes has 
emerged from these cases. If the prohibition is to be a useful pro-
tection for criminal defendants without unduly disrupting the 
administration of justice, it must be applied only after a prinicpled 
analysis that recognizes the functions of the prohibition in protecting 
individual expectations and curbing legislative abuses. 
Justice Chase's list of ex post facto laws excluded changes in the 
procedures used to determine guilt and affix penalties, with the ex-
ception of changes in the rules of evidence. Before the Supreme 
Court first considered the applicability of the ex post facto prohibition 
to procedural changes, treatise writers like Judge Cooley had reached 
firm conclusions on the issue: 
[S]o far as the mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party has 
no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist that his 
case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be 
investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies must always 
be under the control of the legislature, and it would create endless 
confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to be conducted 
only in accordance with the rules of practice, and heard only by the 
courts, in existence when its facts arose.m; 
DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960). See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 
921 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. '1'70 (1943) (plurality opinion). Cf. Schware v. 
Board of Bar Examiuers, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (using prior membership in Communist 
Party as a basis for disqualification from bar membership found not to have sufficient 
regulatory purpose); United States v. Wasser, 476 F.2d llll (7th Cir. 1973) (dictum) 
(limiting the activities of former government attorneys found to serve a legitimate 
regulatory purpose). 
54. But see James v. Twomey, 466 F.2d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1972): Donald v. Jones, 
445 F.2d 601 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971): United States v. Papworth, 156 
F. Supp. 842, 852 (N.D. Tex. 1957). 
55. T. COOLEY, supra note 29, at 272. Bishop seems to have come to similar conclu-
sions. In the 1858 edition of his Criminal Law he stated that "a statute creating a new 
court, or giving jurisdiction to an existing one, to try offenses previously committed, 
is not ex post facto." J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW 148 (2d ed. 1858). In the 1872 edition 
of Criminal Procedure, this point was elaborated: 
[R]emedies may be changed from time to time by statutes, and they are to be 
sought in the courts according to the forms existing when the suit is carried on, 
though the right may have originated when the law of the remedy was different, 
But where a private right has vested in an individual, the chan~e of the remedy 
cannot be carried so far as to take away the right, Now, withm this principle, 
the various absolute rights of prisoners, especially the constitutional ones, in 
respect of their defence cannot be taken away. But they can be modified as to 
time and place, and manner of their enforcement-only the substance of them 
must be preserved. 
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Judge Cooley admitted, however, that while legislatures "may pre-
scribe altogether different modes of procedure in [their] discretion 
... in so doing, they must not dispense with any of those substantial 
protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused 
of crime."56 Unfortunately, he failed to explain which procedural 
protections were sufficiently "substantial" to come within this lim-
ited protection.57 Cooley's language, often quoted in subsequent ex 
post facto procedural cases, triggered the search for a "substantial 
right" "vested" in the defendant that was unlawfully "taken away" 
by a legislative change.58 Under such a vague standard, however, 
courts rarely invalidated procedural changes not infringing express 
constitutional rights. Indeed, many judges found abhorrent the idea 
that nonconstitutional rights could "vest" upon commission of a 
·wrong.59 
On twn occasions the Supreme Court found that changes in 
criminal procedures amounted to ex post facto laws. In Kring v. 
Missouri,60 the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced for 
second degree murder after several trials for first degree murder 
failed to reach a valid verdict. The conviction was overturned when 
it was shown that the prosecutor had promised a lesser sentence than 
that imposed. 61 At the time the crime was committed, a conviction 
for second degree murder served as an acquittal of first degree 
murder. A state constitutional change62 after the crime abrogated 
J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 115, at 70 (2d ed. 1872). Both Bishop and Cooley 
seem to have viewed the imposition of criminal punishments for wrongs against the 
state as directly analogous to the award of civil remedies for ·wrongs against an 
individual. 
56. T. Coou:v, supra note 29, at 272. 
57. Cooley did question the decision in State v. Arlin, 39 N.H. 179 (1859). In that 
case, the punishment for robbery was reduced to such an extent that the defendant was 
no longer entitled to counsel, to process to compel witnesses, to a copy of his indict• 
ment, or to a list of his jurors, since all of these rights were incident only to more 
severe penalties. He described these protections, not then thought to be constitutionally 
required, as "securities against unjust convictions," the removal of which "was directly 
calculated to increase the party's peril" and therefore ought to fit "within the reason 
of the rule which holds a law ex post facto which changes the rules of evidence after 
the fact •••• " T. COOLEY, supra note 29, at 268 n.l. 
58. This analysis, dwelling on the vesting of absolute rights, followed the general 
pattern of constitutional interpretation in the nineteenth century and its approach to 
retroactive statutes generally. See Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: 
A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 781-96 (1936). 
59. See, e.g., State v. Arlin, 39 N.H. 179, 181 (1859). Smith, Retroactive Laws and 
Vested Rights, 5 TEXAS L. REv. 231 (1927) (pt. I), 6 TEXAS L. REv. 409 (1928) (pt. II). 
60. 107 U.S. 221 (1883). 
61. This case might well have been decided on double jeopardy grounds today. 
See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 
(2d Cir. 1965). 
62. The opinion made no mention of the significance of the fact that this was a 
constitutional rather than a statutory change. Many later cases have also ignored the 
distinction. See, e.g., State v. Kavanaugh, 32 N.M. 404, 258 P. 209 (1927). It might be 
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this rule, however, and the defendant was subsequently retried and 
convicted of first degree murder. The Missouri courts concluded that 
the change was procedural and therefore not subject to ex post 
facto attack. 63 In reversing, the Supreme Court invalidated the retro-
active application of the change by stretching the categories in 
Calder: The new rule "so change[ d] the rules of evidence that what 
was conclusive evidence of innocence of the higher grade of murder 
when the crime was committed, namely: a judicial conviction for a 
lower grade of homicide, is not received as evidence at all, or if 
received is given no weight in behalf of the offender. [It also] 
change[ d] the punishment," since under the old rule the defendant 
"could never be tried or punished by death."64 Dissatisfied with the 
narrow categories in Calder, the Court went on to conclude that a 
change in procedure "alter[ing] the situation of a party to his dis-
advantage"65 could not be applied to crimes committed prior to the 
change without violating the ex post facto prohibition. In so holding, 
the Court repudiated the sharp distinction between substantive and 
procedural law relied upon by the Missouri courts: 
But it cannot be sustained ·without destroying the value of the con-
stitutional provision, that a law, however it may invade or modify 
the rights of a party charged with crime, is not an ex post facto law, 
if it comes ·within either of these comprehensive branches of the law 
designated as Pleading, Practice and Evidence. 
Can the law ·with regard to bail, to indictments, to grand juries, 
to the trial jury, all be changed to the disadvantage of the prisoner 
by State legislation after the offense was committed, and such legis-
lation not held to be ex post facto because it relates to proce-
dure ... ? 
And can any substantial right which the law gave the defendant 
at the time to which his guilt relates be taken away from him by ex 
post facto legislation, because, in the use of a modern phrase, it is 
called a law of procedure? We think it cannot.66 
The Court clearly viewed as within the ex post facto prohibition 
many changes involving aspects of the criminal process that few 
argued that constitutional changes should not be considered obnoxious as ex post facto 
if the constitution is viewed as embodying the contract between the state and its citizens, 
Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). An individual remaining within the 
state after a newly enacted constitution would be deemed to have consented to the 
change. This argument, however, is easily defeated by an observation of the realities 
of citizen participation in the drafting of state constitutional changes. 
63 .. State v. Kring, 11 Mo. App. 92, 100, afjd., 74 Mo. 612 (1881). 
64. 107 U.S. at 228. 
65. 107 U.S. at 235. Justice Miller borrowed this definition from the opinion of 
Justice Washington in United States v. Hall, 2 Wash. C.C. 366 (1809). This earlier 
case also contained language to the effect that any law that "takes away" or "impairs the 
defense" of an accused must be considered ex post facto. 
66. 107 U.S. at 232, 
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would contend anyone had relied on, and still fewer would suggest 
were designed to deter criminal behavior. But because of the po-
tential power of the state and the vulnerability of the accused, the 
Court concluded, the prohibition should be applied not only to 
changes in laws that are meant to guide conduct, but to all changes 
that enhance the position of the state in criminal trials at the ex-
pense of the defendant. Off the Court, the author of the Kring opin-
ion later defined ex post facto laws as those laws that affect "the 
individual by increasing his liability to criminal prosecution."67 
In a series of later cases, however, the Supreme Court sustained 
the application of procedural statutes in trials for crimes allegedly 
committed before the statutes were enacted.68 In all of these cases, 
the Court stated simply that the defendant had not been deprived 
of a substantial or vested right and did not examine the resulting 
disadvantage to the defendant. Nevertheless, the Court was not quite 
ready to abandon the logic of Kring and deny that procedural rights 
unprotected by express constitutional provisions could be sufficiently 
substantial to fall within the ex post facto prohibition. Thus, in 
Thompson v. Utah,69 the Court for a second time applied the pro-
hibition to a procedural change that, in the Court's view, infringed 
upon such a right. 
In Thompson, the alleged offense was committed and the defen-
dant first tried while Utah was a territory governed by federal law 
guaranteeing a trial by a jury of twelve. After Utah was admitted 
to the Union, the defendant was retried and convicted under state 
law requiring only eight jurors. Reversing the conviction, the Court 
held that the constitutional right to trial by jury applied in criminal 
prosecutions in the territories, that only a twelve-member jury could 
67. S. MILLER, LECfURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 537 (1891). 
68. See Gut v. Minnesota, 79 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35 (1870) (change in the boundaries of 
the districts within a state in which a criminal trial could be held); Hopt v. Utah, 110 
U.S. 574 (1884) (change in the rules of evidence that allowed convicted felons to 
testify); Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891) (change in venue rules in federal 
territories); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894) (restructuring of the Missouri 
supreme court that affected the number of judges hearing the defendant's case); 
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896) (legislative change that restricted jury mem-
bership to registered voters of "good intelligence, sound judgment and fair character"). 
All but the decision in Duncan were perfunctory statements by Justice Harlan. 
In Hopt, the evidentiary change was found not to be ex post facto despite the fourth 
category relating to evidence in the Calder list. The change in that case was found to 
"relate to modes of procedure only, in which no one can be said to have a vested 
right •••• " Only those changes in evidence that changed "the amount or degree of 
proof essential to conviction" or "the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts 
necessary to establish guilt" were thought to be ex post facto. no U.S. at 590. Justice 
Chase had not made this distinction in his Calder opinion, for he included in his 
examples of undesirable precedents the removal of the requirement of the second 
witness in treason cases and the removal of a wife's incompetency. See Calder v. Bull, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798) (Chase, J.). 
69. 170 U.S. 343 (1898). 
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satisfy the requirement,70 and that, since the defendant had this right 
when he allegedly committed the offense, the right could not be 
taken from him in his second trial. Justice Harlan, writing for the 
Court, was apparently untroubled by the logical implication of the 
decision-that rights vested in the defendant upon commission of 
a ·wrong.71 The kind of disadvantage to the defendant that renders 
a procedural change ex post facto, the Court generalized, is limited 
to those "materially impair[ing] the right of the accused to have the 
question of his guilt determined according to the law as it was when 
the offense was committed."72 Citing Kring for the limited conclusion 
that procedural changes could be ex post facto, rather than for the 
broad proposition that the clauses prohibit all changes altering the 
situation of a party to his disadvantage, the Court concluded that 
the jury-trial right the defendant had been denied was the kind of 
substantial right that had been sought in earlier cases: 
The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the general rule 
that an accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure, 
as in determining whether particular statutes by their operation take 
from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution, as vital for the protection of life and 
liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the 
offe~e charged against him.73 
While Thompson limited the scope of the ex post facto prohi-
bition as set forth in Kring, Justice Harlan's language in Thompson 
was nevertheless susceptible of constructions that placed significant 
limitations on the power of legislatures to apply procedural changes 
to past crimes. Later Supreme Court cases apparently ignored Kring, 
however, and eschewed construing Thompson as establishing any 
significant restraint on legislatures. The ratio decidendi in Thomp-
son, these later cases suggested, was that the defendant had been 
constitutionally guaranteed a jury trial of twelve at the time of his 
offense: Thompson did not limit the power of legislatures to make 
changes in nonconstitutional procedural rights.74 Several decisions 
70. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Court overruled this aspect of 
Thompson and held that a 12-member jury is not constitutionally required. 
71. This decision was probably largely influenced by Justice Harlan's personal 
opinion regarding the desirability of jury trials. For a survey of his persistent attempts 
to find them required whenever possible, see Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine 
of Territorial Incorporation, 26 CoLUM. L. REv. 823 (1926). 
72. 170 U.S. at 351. 
73. 170 U.S. at 352. 
74. In Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898), the defendant was tried and 
convicted of murder, but the conviction was reversed because of the improper admis• 
sion of comparative handwriting samples. Before his second trial, the state legislature 
loosened the evidentiary restrictions to allow such comparative samples. Justice Harlan 
could not find that "the accused had any vested right in the rule of evidence which 
obtained prior to the passage of the Missouri statute, nor that the rule established by 
that statute entrenched upon any of the essential rights belonging to one put on trial 
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sustaining procedural changes distinguished Kring and Thompson 
by stating that a defendant is disadvantaged only when a right is 
taken away, not when a change facilitates the prosecution's task.75 
The ultimate question, whether any right that had never been con-
stitutionally protected could be a "substantial right," was left un-
answered: 
Just what alterations of procedure ,vill be held to be of sufficient 
moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition cannot be em-
braced within a formula or stated in a general proposition. The 
distinction is one of degree. But the constitutional provision was 
intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and 
oppressive legislation, and not to limit the legislative control of rem-
edies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of sub-
stance. 76 
Courts employing the "substantial right" test have held that the 
ex post facto clauses will not be violated by the retroactive appli-
cation of most procedural changes,77 including changes that arguably 
for a public offence." 171 U.S. at 388. See Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589 
(1901) (upholding statute allowing state to appeal the grant of a new trial); Beazell v. 
Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) (upholding change according trial judges discretion in 
granting separate trials). In neither Mallet nor Thompson v. Missouri did the Court 
make note of the particularized effect of the new rule in the case before it. 
75. See, e.g., Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 387-88 (1898). 
76. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925). 
77. Thus, the ex post facto clauses have been held not to prohibit the retroactive 
application of changes in the location, jurisdiction, or composition of a trial or appel-
late court, e.g., Gut v. Minnesota, 79 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35 (1870), in the nature of the 
accusatorial body and its members, People v. Schmidt, 33 Cal. App. 426, 165 P. 555 
(1917) (abolishment of right to challenge grand jury for prejudice); State v. Pell, 140 
Iowa 655, 119 N.W. 154 (1909) (temporary procedure for selection of grand jurors 
when no other procedure provided); Jones v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 661, 10 S.E. 1005 
(1890) (writ of capias replacing examination before a justice of the peace in mis-
demeanor cases), in the requirements for a valid indictment, e.g., Commissioner v. 
Kelley, 184 Mass. 320, 68 N.E. 346 (1903) (statute allowing indictment for larceny to 
encompass crime of embezzlement), in the methods of jury selection, e.g., Gibson v. 
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 656 (1896), in the availability of separate trials, despite the result-
ing adverse effects on the number of preemptory challenges and the admissibility of 
evidence, e.g., Sinclair v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 35, 261 S.W .2d 167 (1952), cert. denied, 
346 U.S. 830 (1953), in the reallocation of sentencing duties between judge and jury, 
e.g., Donald v. Decker, 318 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Tex, 1970) (but see Camp v. State, 187 
Ga. 76, 200 S.E. 126 (1938); Winston v. State, 186 Ga. 573, 198 S.E. 667 (1938)), in the 
separation of the jury determination of guilt from the jury determination of the 
sentence, e.g., Todd v. Stynchcombe, 486 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1973), and in the state's 
right to appeal. E.g., People v. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55, 130 P. 1042 (1913). But see State 
v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W.2d 117 (1943); In re Jones, 500 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 1972). 
Significantly, the courts have found the "substantial right" test more useful in 
cases involving the abrogation of the right to indictment by grand jury. In cases arising 
before Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), the ex post facto issue was either 
avoided entirely by giving changes prospective interpretation only, see, e.g., People v. 
Tisdale, 57 Cal. 104 (1880), or by not finding an ex post facto change. See, e.g., People 
v. Campbell, 59 Cal. 243 (1881). But see State v. Kingsly, 10 Mont. 537, 26 P. 1066 
(1891). After the decision in Thompson preserving the right to a petit jury, however, 
other courts found that a constitutionally guaranteed grand jury indictment should 
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have deterrent content such as extensions of statutes of limitation.78 
Significantly, in considering whether procedural changes could be 
ex post facto laws, the Supreme Court has made no mention of fair 
warning, reliance, or the possibility of legislative vindictiveness:70 
The Court has used vague phrases and simplified categories instead 
of formulating an underlying theory for the clauses. 
For the most part, the reliance rationale for the ex post facto 
also be preserved. See Garnsey v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 54'1, 112 P. 24 (1910); State V, 
Rock, 20 Utah 38, 5'1 P. 532 (1899). Contra, State v. Kyle, 166 Mo. 287, 65 S.W. '163 
(1901). Like Thompson, these decisions only considered whether the procedural right 
was sufficiently "substantial" to warrant protection by the ex post facto provision: 
they did not consider why these rights vested and remained only with those whose 
alleged crimes were committed while such rights were constitutionally guaranteed. A 
later federal court found that the grand jury right was substantial enough to be pro• 
tected by the ex post facto clause even though it had been only statutorily guaranteed, 
See Mafnas v. Guam, 228 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1955). See also Putty v. United States, 220 
F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955). 
Several federal cases have indicated that changes in the required number of grand 
jurors present ex post facto problems. See United States v. Haskell, 169 F. 449 (E.D. 
Okla. 1909) (invalidating change in requirement for indictment from 12 out of 16 grand 
jurors to 12 out of 21); United States v. London, 176 F. 976 (E.D. Okla, 1909) (same). 
But see Hallock v. United States, 185 F. 41'1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 220 U.S. 613 (1911) 
(upholding similar change); State v. Kavanaugh, 32 N.M. 404, 258 P. 209 (1927), In 
Hallock the court implied that only constitutional rights were sufficiently substantial 
to warrant ex post facto protection, and unlike the situation in Thompson v, Utah, 
the precise number of jurors was not part of the constitutional guarantee. 
78. The "substantial" and "vested" right language has produced arbitrary results 
in the context of statutes of limitations. An extension of a statute of limitations is 
allowed, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 239 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1956), but the revival 
of a statute after its running is not. State v. Sneed, 25 Tex. Supp. 66 (1860). See Black, 
Statutes of Limitation and the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 26 KY. L.J. 41 (1937), The logic 
offered in support of this distinction is that only when the statute has fully run 
does a defendant acquire a right. The right acquired is that of not being prosecuted, 
because his full right to liberty has been restored in a way analogous to the acquisition 
of property through adverse possession. But until this right has vested, the defendant 
has no interest protected under the statute. Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203 (1881): State 
v. Ferrie, 243 La. 416, 144 S.2d 380 (1962). It is possible to articulate a justification 
for the distinction between the revival and the extension of a right to prosecute in 
terms of the ex post facto doctrine: Only when a right to prosecute is revived does 
an act that could not have been punished without the statute become punishable, 
Such a justification, however, only tortures an initially weak definition of the prohi-
bition and explains little. If the statute of limitations is part of the statutory scheme 
of deterrence, the distinction between those that have run and those that have not is 
meaningless. For an unconvincing rationale for the distinction, couched in terms of 
"our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play," see Judge Learned Hand's opinion 
in Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir. 1928). 
79. The arguments made to the Supreme Court have, however, included these 
notions. The state court decision in State v. Mallett, 125 N.C. '118, 34 S.E. 651 (1899), 
affd. sub nom. Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589 (1901), had related the concept 
of reliance to that of vested rights: 
[T]he defendants had no "vested rights" in the remedies and methods of pro-
cedure in trials for crime. They cannot be said to have committed this crime, 
relying upon the fact that there was no appeal given the State in such cases, 
If they had considered that matter they must have known that the State had as 
much power to amend [the section) as it had to pass it, and they committed the 
crime subject to the probability that appeals in rulings upon matters of law 
would be given to the State. 
125 N.C. at 725, 34 S.E. at 653, 
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prohibition is considerably less applicable to procedural changes 
than it is to substantive changes. First, procedural rules are rarely 
enacted to provoke reliance outside the courtroom. Second, while 
many defendants rely on substantive definitions of proscribed con-
duct, few rely on many of the numerous laws regulating the enforce-
ment processes, such as laws governing the availability of bail on 
appeal80 or regulating parole eligibilty requirements.131 Few de-
fendants can make even a colorable showing that they contemplated 
at the time of their alleged crimes such procedural subtleties · as 
where and by whom they would be tried and what evidence could 
be used against them. It would thus be unreasonable for a court, in 
an effort to protect the few defendants who do rely on procedural 
rules, to assume that all defendants so rely. Third, even if reliance 
could be proved, it is doubtful that it deserves constitutional pro-
tection. In effect, a defendant claiming reliance is alleging that he 
acted on the premise that the prosecution would face certain ob-
stacles at trial that were subsequently removed. The interest he wants 
elevated to the level of a consttutional right is a rather dubious in-
terest in being acquitted at trial after having committed a criminal of-
fense-an interest hardly worthy of preservation. Finally, a defendant 
challenging recently enacted procedures will often be claiming that 
he did not commit the alleged act rather than, as in the instance 
of a defendant challenging a substantive-law change, that his act 
was legal when committed. Reliance would be inapplicable in this 
instance. 
Some procedural rules, however, provoke reasonable reliance out-
side the courtroom, and, indeed, may have been enacted at least 
partially to influence behavior. The inadmissibility of pleadings as 
evidence in subsequent cases may be designed to encourage frank 
and full pleadings;82 the incompetence of one spouse to testify against 
the other may be designed to promote marital harmony by allowing 
open communication.83 The abrogation of such rules would seem 
unfair to those who had relied on them. Where reliance on an estab-
lished procedure is reasonable, and the application of a new pro-
cedure to acts committed prior to its enactment would unfairly 
frustrate that reliance, courts should require that the state demon-
strate a legitimate need to employ the new procedure in cases involv-
ing prior acts. At the trial and appeal stages, a legitimate state interest 
in applying the new procedure to all criminal proceedings, instead 
BO. See Green v. State, 238 S.2d 296 (Fla. 1970). 
Bl. See Love v. Fitzharris, 311 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd., 460 F.2d 382 (9th 
Cir. 1972); Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967), aff d. per curiam, 390 
U.S. 713 (1968). 
82. See Frisby v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 22 (1911). 
83. For cases rejecting this argument, see for example People v. Bradford, 70 Cal. 
2d 333,450 P.2d 46, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1969); State v. Pope, 73 Wash. 2d 919, 442 P.2d 
994 (1968); State v. Clevenger, 69 Wash. 2d 136, 417 P.2d 626 (1966). 
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of just to those in which the alleged act occurred after the change 
was enacted, may be rare since it is easy to determine whether the 
defendant's acts were committed prior to the enactment of the 
procedure. Depending on the trial backlog, most new procedures 
can be fully operational within one or two years. 
Changes in criminal procedures are rarely objectionable on the 
ground that they cannot serve their purported purpose. Many pro-
cedural laws merely regulate the apprehension and conviction of 
individuals. Others, while effecting some slight punishment changes, 
are enacted to further the rehabilitation of those convicted (for 
example, laws regulating the structure and operation of parole 
boards or the administration of prisons) and not to implement a 
decision to deter certain conduct to a greater or lesser extent. In 
short, procedural rules direct prospectively the activities involved 
in bringing an individual to trial, determining guilt, and imposing 
punishment; they generally do not change the legal significance of 
any past act.84 Thus, rarely will this factor override the desirability 
of giving legislatures full power to reform criminal procedures and 
the inconvenience of maintaining many different sets of procedural 
rules to be applied according to the date of the alleged offense. 
Changes in procedures, however, may well result from improper 
legislative attempts to affect pending or imminent prosecutions or 
from other vindictive motives of legislatures; courts faced with ex 
post facto challenges to changes in criminal procedure should be 
alert to this possibility. While cases of improper legislative motiva-
tion may be rare, they are not difficult to envision.8G Procedural 
changes tailored to a particular case can greatly and unfairly affect 
the outcome of that case even when the changes do not deny due 
process to other defendants generally. Certain changes in evidence 
admissibility rules, in evidentiary safeguards (such as the two-witness 
or corroborative-evidence requirements), or in courtroom strategies 
(such as allowing the prosecution both opening and closing argu-
ments), could compound to ovenvhelm a defendant at trial. Such 
legislative control over the outcome of a trial seems no less objec-
tionable than a direct legislative imposition of punishment through 
a bill of attainder. 
A procedure that denies due process or violates a constitutional 
provision meant to assure a fair trial should be invalidated on those 
84. Legislative attempts to correct a jurisdictional or procedural flaw after the trial 
is finished have on occasion been invalidated as ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, 
See Putty v. United States, 200 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955): 
In re Murphy, 1 Woolw. 141 (8th Cir. 1867) (S, Miller, J., presiding), 
85. Cf. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 206 (1869), where the Court, without 
reference to the ex post facto limitation, upheld a congressional act politically moti• 
vated that removed the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review a denial of a writ of 
habeas oorpus. The dissent in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), relied on this 
case as clear precedent for the proposition that no procedural statute could be ex post 
facto. 107 U.S. at 242, 
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grounds rather than on ex post facto grounds since the ex post facto 
provision does not prohibit the prospective application of a law.86 
The ex post facto prohibition is still of importance in the fair trial 
context, however, not only as an additional protection for the defen-
dant from legislative attempts (short of a denial of due process) to 
influence his trial, but as a means for courts somewhat disingenu-
ously to invalidate laws, meant to affect certain trials, that decrease 
the accuracy and effectiveness of the judicial process. 
Courts understandably have been reluctant to investigate legis-
lative motive. However, such an investigation may be necessary to 
implement the function of the ex post facto prohibition as a curb on 
legislative power. 87 Reviewing courts should make such an inquiry 
in the obvious case where the procedural change is of limited applica-
tion or is in clear conflict with the consensus as to reasonable trial 
procedures. In less egregious cases, courts should examine the relative 
advantage given the prosecution, and, if the disadvantage to the de-
fendant could have affected the outcome of the trial, should consider 
the possibility of purposeful legislative interference. To deal with 
such cases, courts must choose benveen an absolute rule that forbids 
such suspect procedural changes and a rule that requires an examina-
tion of legislative intent to manipulate the trial. While a policy of 
examining legislative motive would result in fewer invalidations and 
provide greater flexibility for the legislature, the difficulty of the 
task may tip the balance in favor of an absolute, prophylactic rule. 
An analysis of the ex post facto prohibition that stresses its pur-
poses rather than focuses on set categories avoids the need to make 
the artificial distinction between substance and procedure88 often 
relied upon by courts in dealing with ex post facto challenges. Such 
an analysis would be useful to courts in considering changes in evi-
dentiary rules-an area where rigid substance-procedure distinctions 
have been made for a variety of purposes.89 The analysis outlined 
86. The ex post facto prohibition may have been used in lieu of the due process 
clause in United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where the court 
ruled that a statute mandating the admission of an accused's prior criminal record if 
the accused testified could not be applied in a case where the alleged crime was com-
mitted before the passage of the statute: The statute affected the defendant"by altering 
his situation to his disadvantage, taking away or impairing his defense, and lessening 
the government's burden of proof because of the effect of the introduction of such 
evidence on the jury. Contra, Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C. App.), cert. 
denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972). 
87. See Fletcher v. Peck, IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810). The Supreme Court 
has been willing to take part in such inquiries in cases of bills of attainder. See United 
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 302 (1946) (holding that although Congress did have full 
power over salary appropriations, this power could not be used against specific 
individuals without violating the prohibition against bills of attainder). See also 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
88. It has been suggested that for this purpose the line is clearer than it is for 
many others. See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 
YALE L.J. 333, 342 (1933). 
89. Compare People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d 742, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1972) (year-
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above would uphold the long-standing conclusion that the clauses 
prohibit the retroactive application of evidentiary changes that, in 
effect, alter the elements of an offense.90 A change that makes addi-
tional evidence admissible, on the other hand, even though it may 
allow the admission of the only evidence available to the prosecution 
to prove an essential element of the alleged crime, would not be 
proscribed since such a change does not create criminal liability 
without warning91 or frustrate reasonable reliance.92 Changes in 
corroborative-evidence requirements, which similarly are meant to 
ensure the reliability of testimony, should be allowed. The fact that 
the prosecution's task is facilitated is alone insufficient to invalidate 
such changes.93 To the extent such evidentiary changes are made in 
good faith with the intent of improving the criminal process, they 
should not be considered violations of the ex post facto clause. 
and-a-day causation rule for homicide viewed as merely a matter of procedure, and 
therefore its abrogation did not violate the ex post facto prohibition), with People v. 
Dotson, 72 Misc. 2d 545, 339 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Suffolk County Ct. 1972) (removal of corrobo· 
rative evidence requirement in a rape prosecution held impermissible). 
90. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884) (dictum) (ex post facto clause applies 
to those changes that "alter the degree or lessen the amount or measure, of the proof 
which was made necessary to conviction when the crime was committed'1• Although 
the Supreme Court has never had occasion to apply this rule, other courts have done 
so on occasion. See DeWoody v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 52, 87 Cal. Rptr. 210 
(1970) (refusing to allow new presumptions regarding the results of blood tests); State v. 
Johnson, 12 Minn. 476 (1866) (invalidating the state's retroactive use of a presumption 
of second marriage on a mere showing of cohabitation in a polygamy prosecution). 
Cf. United States v. Williams, 475 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (invalidating retroactive 
application of shift in the burden of proof in presenting the insanity defense); People 
v. Dawson, 210 Cal. 366, 292 P. 267 (1930) (new statute that eliminated the state's need 
to prove that the defendant had in fact served his time before he could be sentenced 
under a habitual offenders act violated the ex post facto prohibition). 
91. In other cases, however, evidence admitted regarding the past behavior of the 
defendant, other than that defined in the indictment itself, may in effect create 
criminal liability even though such behavior when engaged in was not proscribed, 
Such liability can be created either because the crime itself involves a pattern of 
conduct or because such evidence establishes a presumption of continued criminal 
conduct. For example, in Caldwell v. State, 17 Conn. 467 (1846), evidence of past 
activities at an establishment alleged to be a brothel was admitted to prove the 
"reputation" of the house despite the fact that brothels had not been prohibited 
when such activity took place. Similarly, in conspiracy prosecutions, evidence as to 
conduct occurring before the enactment of the substantive statute has been found 
admissible to show the existence and purpose of the conspiracy as well as the intent 
and purpose of post-enactment behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Fino, 478 F.2d 35, 
36 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Marchesani, 457 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1972), 
These courts refused to apply the ex post facto prohibition in this context because 
questions of admissibility of evidence were viewed as procedural. Once the substantive• 
procedural distinction is abandoned, it becomes clear that to the extent that proof of 
conduct before the statute making the conduct criminal is the only proof upon which 
criminal liability rests, the ex post facto clause has been violated. 
92. See, e.g., Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898) (admissibility of hand• 
writing samples); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (competency of felons to testify). 
93. Courts have generally not considered these changes violative of the ex post facto 
clause. See, e.g., People v. Nival, 33 N.Y.2d 391, 308 N.E.2d 883, 353 N.Y.S.2d 409 
(1974). 
